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8Hard Power in Hard Times: 
Relative Military Power in an era 
of Budgetary Constraint
Adam Quinn
FROM IMPERIAL POWER TO IMPECUNIOUS CIRCUMSTANCE
Such was the extent of the United States’ dominance in the arena of military capability over the last two decades that discussion of others’ capacity to rival it largely disappeared from 
mainstream discussion. Though the US was probably the world’s foremost military power even 
during the Cold War, there was still scope for anxious public debate in the 1950s and 1970s of 
imagined ‘missile gaps’, i.e. a Soviet advantage in advanced delivery technology for nuclear 
weapons. In 1990-91, however, two events occurred in quick succession which inaugurated an 
era of total American pre-eminence. First, the United States trounced Iraq, previously considered 
a military force of at least credible middle-ranking standing, in the Gulf War, displaying in 
the process the fruits of many years of investment in advanced battlefield technology. Then 
Communism stumbled and the Soviet Union fell apart, ushering in a wave of economic 
dysfunction and military wastage from which the Russian state has never fully recovered. 
Such was the United States’ superiority in the military sphere during the mid- and late-1990s that the 
most frequently cited benchmark for its military capabilities was whether or not it could successfully 
fight not one major war but two at once. As the 21st century dawned, with no plausible peer competitor 
state in sight, and triggered by the spectacular terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States 
began to indulge in conceptions of absolute security and risk-neutralisation beyond the imagining even 
of hegemonic powers past. This was encapsulated in most extreme form by Vice President Cheney’s 
famous exposition (to the author Ron Suskind) of the ‘One Percent Doctrine’: that if even a one-percent 
risk should exist of nuclear proliferation to terrorists then the United States must respond as though it 
were a certainty. 
Whether this period of ‘full-spectrum dominance’ on the part of the US military ultimately served 
the nation well in terms of its broader grand strategy is a matter for debate. Many would argue that 
the lack of a meaningful counterweight in the international state system contributed to the United 
States overreaching itself, launching under-considered military operations of great financial cost and 
questionable strategic benefit, such as the occupation of Iraq and the de facto occupation of Afghanistan. 
What is increasingly less debatable, however, is that over the coming years this period of exceptional 
American preponderance in hard power across the full spectrum of capabilities will be drawing to 
a close. In the absence of some unanticipated event, the United States will remain the single most 
capable military power for the foreseeable future, and in those places and areas of capability to which 
it chooses to devote most resources and particular determination, it may remain so by a wide margin. 
Its across-the-board dominance, however, will steadily shrink. This is for two key reasons: because 
its own difficult fiscal position will force it towards overall spending reductions, forcing tough 
choices as to which capacities to sustain; and because other powers, most especially China, 
9look set to continue increasing investment in military 
capabilities during the same period, allowing them 
to narrow the gap in some areas through imitation 
of US strengths (aircraft carriers, stealth fighter jets, 
etc.) and perhaps also master technology with the 
potential to neutralise US advantages (‘carrier killer’ 
missiles, anti-satellite weapons, cyber-warfare, etc.).
As has been outlined at more length by Iwan Morgan 
elsewhere in this report, the outlook for the US 
government’s fiscal position, and thus for the size of 
the resource base from which defence and security 
expenditures are derived, is bleak. For the last two 
financial years, the US federal government has been 
running a deficit of well over $1 trillion, and without 
increased revenues or major spending cuts (or both) 
it will continue to add hundreds of billions to the 
national debt every year for the foreseeable future. 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, existing 
spending plans would see total national debt rise to 
90% percent of GDP by 2020, which, combined with 
the likely rising cost of borrowing rates as overall 
debt climbs, could take the combined cost of new 
borrowing and refinancing old debt by that time to 
$5 trillion per year. These figures are bad enough, but 
in fact tell only half the story. From 2020 onwards, 
government commitments to social security and 
healthcare spending are projected to explode as the 
consequences of increased longevity and an aging 
population begin to be felt, plunging the government 
finances into new, irrecoverable trouble. Thus the 
United States faces a short- and medium-term fiscal 
crisis attributable to the collapse in revenues and 
economic growth caused by the Great Recession 
commencing in 2008, which serves to compound the 
long-projected long-term crisis arising from essentially 
unfunded promises of ever-greater government outlay 
on domestic programmes.
Hence, one way or another – whether sooner, as part 
of a deliberate programme of fiscal retrenchment 
to ensure long-term solvency, or later, as a result 
of the government eventually running out of road in 
sustaining spending through new borrowing – the US 
government faces the need for permanent reductions 
in its annual outgoings in the order of hundreds of 
billions of dollars per year. On the level of pure theory, 
it is conceivable that these savings might be found 
entirely within domestic spending, in areas such as 
healthcare and public pensions, while leaving national 
security spending untouched. Political reality, however, 
suggests that, in the absence of a galvanising national 
security crisis of Pearl Harbour proportions, this will 
not be possible: security and defence spending will 
be obliged to bear some significant share of the cost. 
THE SCALPEL AND THE BROADSWORD
President Obama has set a target of $400-450 billion 
in savings from the defence budget over 12 years. 
Robert Gates, who left his post as Secretary of Defence 
in 2011, managed before his retirement to outline a 
plan to save $78 billion over four years, as well as 
cancelling some expensive and symbolic procurement 
items like the F-22 jet. The unenviable task of finding 
the remainder of the cuts falls to his successor, Leon 
Panetta, moving over after a competent tenure as 
CIA Director. With Gates having warned that the 
‘low-hanging fruit’ of defence cuts has already been 
dispensed with, those planned future cuts must fall in 
areas that carry significant implication for American 
capacities, thus forcing the Department of Defence 
to confront tough, resource-driven choices of a sort 
it has been almost entirely spared for the last decade. 
The task faced is daunting, though it probably ought 
to be appended by three caveats. The first is that 
defence spending starts from a notable high. 2012 
budget requests put Pentagon spending at just over 
$700 billion dollars for the year, up more than 80% 
since 2001. If one adds in defence-related spending 
under other budget headings, the figure rises to over 
a trillion dollars. This figure represents the end result 
of a period of vigorous expansion in the national 
security apparatus during the years of the George W. 
Bush administration, when expenditure was driven 
ever upwards through the combination of military 
activism abroad in the wake of 9/11, ideological 
enthusiasm for the expansion of defence capability, 
and a widespread lack of oncern regarding mounting 
government deficits. All this means that the United 
States could potentially make significant cuts now 
while leaving the defence budget better off in cash 
terms than it was a decade ago. 
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The second caveat is that the US has been spending 
very large sums of money financing two wars – in Iraq 
and Afghanistan – which according to present plans 
are to be drawn down rapidly in scale in the near 
future. In the absence of a late new agreement with 
the Iraqi government, all US troops are set to depart 
from that country by the end of 2011. Meanwhile in 
Afghanistan, a major drawdown in troop numbers 
is expected over the coming year. Given that at their 
peak each war cost well in excess of $100 billion per 
year, and that one effectively escalated in cost as the 
other was receding, the end of these deployments – if 
it does occur – will represent a significant saving. There 
will still be substantial legacy costs left to pay after 
the winding down of those conflicts, from replacing 
equipment and materiel used or lost to the continuing 
cost of medical and social care for veterans, but likely 
the worst of the war’s costs are in the past. This means 
that some budgetary relief may be expected simply 
from the pursuit of current strategy.
Thirdly, Gates, Panetta, and others involved in the 
process of contemplating how to make the proposed 
spending cuts real have been adamant that the result 
will not be a simple salami-slicing, i.e. an across-the-
board spending reduction in all areas. This, it has been 
noted, would spread harm across the entirety of US 
capabilities, raising spectres of the ‘hollow military’, 
unfit for practical purpose, which Gates and others 
believe was the result of the previous era of post-
Vietnam cuts in the 1970s. Rather, the intention is 
to try and marry the process of budget-cutting with 
strategic thinking about the United States’ objectives 
over coming decades and the means needed to achieve 
them. Thus some areas may see investment preserved, 
or even increased, while others deemed less essential 
to future strategic priorities will bear the brunt of the 
cuts, perhaps being cut altogether. If the primary 
strategic challenge of the future is seen, for example, 
to be a rising state power in Asia, or cyber-warfare, 
then those priorities might even see increased funding; 
it has already been stated that there will not be a 
reduction in troop numbers in the Pacific.
None of these qualifications, however, should distract 
from the fact that it will be a profound challenge to 
trim spending in such a way as to retain the capacity 
to project power in all the ways the United States 
desires. There will be serious divisions within the 
armed forces themselves regarding future strategic 
direction: the running disagreement from the last 
decade, between those officers favouring heavy 
investment in expensive counterinsurgency capacity-
building and those who prefer to focus on the prospect 
of future conflict with rising states, can only grow 
more intense in a budgetary environment where only 
one can be properly resourced. If decisions are taken 
to scale back procurement programmes and close or 
merge military bases, there will be clashes between 
the Pentagon leadership and the triangle of elected 
politicians, soldiers, and corporations comprising 
Eisenhower’s ‘military-industrial complex’. And with 
rampant inflation in the cost of troops’ and veterans’ 
healthcare benefits ‘eating the Department of Defence 
alive’, in Robert Gates’ phrase, the department has 
already undertaken certain expensive commitments 
to its employees which it will be hard to claw back 
without a degree of rancour entering the court of 
public opinion. 
Meanwhile, for all the pain foretold under present 
plans, there is the outside prospect of far worse cuts if 
the US Congress doesn’t succeed in reaching a solution 
to the partisan impasse over long-term budget plans. 
At present, if the special bipartisan debt reduction 
committee tasked to reach a consensus on the way 
forward should fail, it will trigger another $500 billion 
in automatic cuts falling upon the Pentagon. Few 
believe that this ‘doomsday mechanism’, intended to 
incentivise compromise during negotiations, would 
really be allowed to go into effect unamended, 
but Secretary Panetta took it seriously enough to 
deliver the message direct to Congress that it risked 
a catastrophic degrading of core American capabilities 
if anything resembling it should unfold. 
RISING NEW POWER, FORGING NEW WEAPONS
These are not the sorts of challenges facing a 
rising nation such as China, presently accelerating 
without undue fanfare towards status as the United 
States’ primary rival in the military sphere within the 
foreseeable future. Rather, the chief tasks for Chinese 
strategists are: to ensure that the ever-increasing 
resources being devoted to military investment are 
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spent wisely, and to lay the foundations of that 
investment without unduly alarming the United States. 
The immediate prospects for China’s defence spending 
are essentially the opposite of the degenerative pattern 
facing the United States: starting from a relatively 
low base of spending as a proportion of GDP, China 
is increasing its military budget by 12.7 percent in 
2011, an acceleration of previous growth after a 
brief slowdown to 7.5 percent growth in 2010 after 
previous years of double-digit growth. With Chinese 
military investment increases thus outpacing even the 
robust pace of overall Chinese economic growth, it 
is obvious that if the United States simultaneously 
begins to cut its budget then the gap between the 
two countries will be shrinking at a noticeable rate. 
The US lead over Chinese spending levels will still 
be immense at first: even after the 2011 increase, 
China’s military budget will stand only at $91.5 billion. 
Nevertheless, the direction of travel is clear. This sense 
that the American advantage may be beginning to 
wane can only be reinforced when one factors in 
analysts’ concerns regarding the accuracy of Chinese 
figures: it is uncertain that true spending levels are 
openly declared (they may well be higher), and even 
if they are, Chinese funds invested domestically 
may go further in producing concrete military 
improvement than the equivalent dollar amount of 
American spending on its inflation-racked and war-
encumbered defence establishment. The assessment 
of the Pentagon itself is that China will have developed 
a ‘modern’ military apparatus by 2020, with major 
current programmes such as the construction of new 
aircraft carriers, a ‘blue water’ navy, and the home-
grown J-20 stealth fighter jet reaching fruition. China 
has already launched its first carrier, a refitted ex-
Soviet vessel.
Because of its retained military capacity from its days 
as a superpower, especially in the realm of nuclear 
missiles, Russia presently maintains status as the closest 
thing to a peer competitor the United States faces 
in the military sphere, though it is, of course, a very 
distant second in that league. But given its imminent 
demographic struggles, natural-resource -centred 
economy and dysfunctional military institutions (badly 
exposed and worsened in condition during the conflict 
in Chechnya), Russia presents more a vestigial threat 
from a prior era than a rising challenge. China, on the 
other hand, with its growing economy and investment, 
manifestly represents the contender of the future. It 
is as yet unknowable whether that ‘challenge’ might 
ultimately manifest itself in a smooth, delicately 
managed transition towards greater equality over an 
extended period, or as a more dangerous relationship 
defined by mistrust and efforts by each party to 
undermine the other. However, if the status quo can 
be accurately characterised as American military pre-
eminence across the spectrum, then that order will 
assuredly be ‘challenged’, in the broad sense of the 
word, by the forces of change. The capacity of the 
United States to exercise a dominant military sway in 
all regions of the world, in the East Asian oceans as 
readily as in the Caribbean, will increasingly be drawn 
into question. If the US wishes to sustain or grow its 
presence in the East Asian environs, this will mean 
reduction in resources elsewhere.
The United States faces two distinct types of challenge 
in the coming years when it comes to maintaining 
its own military advantage, capacity to defend itself, 
project its power over distance, and command the 
‘global commons’ such as strategic sea routes and 
airspace. The first, which has been tacitly assumed 
as primary in much of what has been said thus far, 
is that a rising power may begin to match the US 
in its existing capabilities through investment in its 
own armed forces. As America’s leaders are shoved 
by budgetary forces to trim numbers, cut back on 
high-tech weapons procurement and limit investment 
in all but the essential, others may come increasingly 
to match it: with more and better advanced ships, 
aircraft and weaponry, as well as more sophisticated 
training and planning. The US currently enjoys an 
advantage in the production and deployment of 
armed unmanned drones, which it has used to strike 
in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, but it cannot be 
long before other powers catch up with the required 
technology, potentially presenting new problems for 
the US as it has its own practices cited as precedent 
for legitimate use.
The second challenge is that technology, and rivals’ 
mastery of it may move forward in bolder leaps, and 
without the resources to invest in a new generation 
of solutions, the United States may, as Andrew 
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Krepinevich has argued, find its military assets and advantages ‘wasting’ faster than it imagines. Presently, 
the United States relies for a large part of its military supremacy on unrivalled air power and the ability to 
project it to almost any part of the world at speed by means of the support structure of its carrier fleet. If 
China should succeed in realising its longstanding aspiration to develop a ‘carrier-killer’ missile, however, this 
would drastically alter US capacity to project power from its present naval vantage points in East Asia, and 
would demand American innovation in ships, planes, or their use merely to recover the present advantage. 
Similarly, a huge part of the United States’ advantage in military affairs stems from its mastery of satellite 
and communications technology and software. China has already demonstrated its capacity to strike down 
a satellite, should the crudest method of countering that be sought. It has also been singled out alongside 
Russia by the US as being at the cutting edge in the development and practice of the techniques of cyber-crime 
and cyber-warfare. If such skills could be deployed well enough to visit major sabotage upon the information 
infrastructure, military or civilian, of the United States, this technique of warfare could be a great leveller, 
neutralising some of the greatest advantages Americans currently hold over all enemies. Cyber-warfare 
is considered a sufficiently worrying threat that it played a major part in NATO’s efforts to develop a new 
‘strategic concept’ for its future.
CONCLUSION
The United States is still, beyond any room for dispute, the pre-eminent military power in the world, and 
leads by a vast margin in terms of dollars spent on national security. It will remain the single greatest military 
power for at least the next 15-20 years. However, the fiscal problems faced by the US government, combined 
with the political calculation that some of the cost of resolving those problems must fall upon the defence 
budget, mean that over the coming decade significant cuts in US defence spending are inevitable. Although 
the starting point of the spending to be cut is high, and although some money can be saved simply through 
the scheduled conclusion of the Iraq and Afghanistan, such cuts will nonetheless force the United States to 
make hard choices about which capacities and programmes it wishes to preserve at the highest level, and 
which it must, however reluctantly, de-prioritise. In what kinds of wars will the United States prepare itself 
to fight? In which geographical theatres? Against what enemies? And what technologies will be required 
to fight them? Many may – rightly – regard these as unremarkable questions of the sort any strategist is 
required to manage in the course of conducting their business. The hardest strategic choices, however, require 
accepting vulnerability in some areas as the price of devoting limited resources to plan for the most plausible 
contingencies. The United States, buffered by a period of relative plenty in defence budgets, has been able to 
avoid some of the hardest choices over the last decade due to a relative abundance of resources. The answer 
to a choice could often be that the United States needed to do ‘both’ not ‘either/or’. American planners 
will now have to decide more firmly between priorities, requiring both fuller thought about what the real 
priorities are, and more daring in being willing to prepare for them while sidelining less likely prospects. In 
the meantime, other powers, most especially China, are well placed to continue to invest heavily in military 
modernisation during this period of American cutbacks. Thus US primacy will come under increasing strain, as 
rising powers both replicate some American capabilities, and perhaps leapfrog others through developments 
in technological skill and weaponry. The era of great American military power will continue for some time; 
but barring a major reversal of the economic trend-lines, the era of American global military dominance will 
be drawing to a close much sooner. ■
